In Thomas Hurka’s Nietzsche: Perfectionist he explores how Nietzsche may be a narrow perfectionist. The central claim of narrow perfectionism is that “human good consists in developing whatever properties are fundamental to human nature, and if it affirms specific goods such as knowledge and achievement it is for embodying these properties” (10). Nietzsche could be read to hold that the will to power is his conception of essential human nature. Meaning human's essential property is the desire to instantiate power; Hurka interprets this as a factual claim. It is not a teleological claim about human ends because Nietzsche rejects the idea that we always strive for our own good, however a teleology is not needed for a narrow form of perfectionism (15).
Perfectionism is a version of maximizing consequentialism, which is not to be conflated with hedonistic perfectionism. Perfectionist consequentialism judges acts largely by their intrinsic nature which is the strength of will they embody (17). As an anti-egalitarian elitist Nietzsche “rests on a distinctive view about social aggregation”. The value of society depends on the excellence of it most perfect members. Nietzsche is indifferent to the masses who are capable of lesser excellence since the value of a society is evaluated based on the level of perfection of its most capable individuals. Thus there is no value in increasing the total amount of excellence among all of societies members. Also it is not egoism, instead its a agent neutral moral viewpoint where everyone has the same goal of contributing to bringing about the most perfect individuals; thus it requires some to sacrifice their resources for the betterment of the more capable, whereas the most capable are required to perfect themselves.
I have concerns about the possibility of implementing this moral doctrine without destroying the value of excellence. Primarily, I see it as self-defeating for those of lesser excellence to selflessly sacrifice themselves for the betterment of others. For if the most excellent substantially benefit from others sacrifice’s, then those receiving the help from others are prevented from actualizing their own excellence on their own which I think is a requirment of excellence. This of course may be a requirement of excellence that Nietzsche himself rejects. But even if he does, then what valuable benefit can those of lesser excellence contribute considering that by definition they are incapable of greatness?
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
The Relationship between the Noble and the Slave
The slave needs the noble man to define himself whereas the noble man defines himself. The slave is unable to self-reflect and make decisions based on internal stimuli, he is reactionary, and subjected to external stimuli such as the noble man to act. The noble man is necessary for the slave.
The noble man does not observe slaves in order to react, but merely for cleaver amusement. The slave being neither necessary nor satisfactory, is accidental to the noble man’s actions. From what I take from Essay 1 of The Genealogy of Morals the noble man is essentially self-sufficient and creates his own character independent of the prevailing conventional norms and he creates his own values. Though by describing the noble man as strong like a beast that he needs others to exercise his strength, his power, over and that is the role slaves play. The noble “designate themselves simply by their superiority in power” and by the character trait of truthfulness(465). The noble are truthful to themselves about who they are and are unafraid of internal evaluation and this is in ‘contradistinction’ to the slave who, incapable of self reflection, uses the noble to construct its identity.
The slave, or herd instinct as also called by Nietzsche, defines itself in relation to the noble. The noble is egoistic and so the slave defines its-self as un-egoistic, which for Nietzsche is utilitarianism. The noble creates value from oneself, it is the source if the good, is what’s best for the creator, and is the source of greatness; the slave takes the only control it can since it lacks creativity and originality by transforming this notion of good into the good in common, thereby democratizing the good and turning it into something mediocre.
The noble man does not observe slaves in order to react, but merely for cleaver amusement. The slave being neither necessary nor satisfactory, is accidental to the noble man’s actions. From what I take from Essay 1 of The Genealogy of Morals the noble man is essentially self-sufficient and creates his own character independent of the prevailing conventional norms and he creates his own values. Though by describing the noble man as strong like a beast that he needs others to exercise his strength, his power, over and that is the role slaves play. The noble “designate themselves simply by their superiority in power” and by the character trait of truthfulness(465). The noble are truthful to themselves about who they are and are unafraid of internal evaluation and this is in ‘contradistinction’ to the slave who, incapable of self reflection, uses the noble to construct its identity.
The slave, or herd instinct as also called by Nietzsche, defines itself in relation to the noble. The noble is egoistic and so the slave defines its-self as un-egoistic, which for Nietzsche is utilitarianism. The noble creates value from oneself, it is the source if the good, is what’s best for the creator, and is the source of greatness; the slave takes the only control it can since it lacks creativity and originality by transforming this notion of good into the good in common, thereby democratizing the good and turning it into something mediocre.
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
In Nietzsche’s Book 5 of The Gay Science he explains what the beholder of metaphorical deicide is left to do. His clarification of “God is Dead” in the 343 of the 5th book is “that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable,” meaning we can longer reasonably and authentically use religion as a foundation of morality and source of a teleos. Throughout the book he opens the readers’ eyes to the self delusional acceptance of a blinding logic, which heretofore has convinced many to sacrifice the substance this life for the mythical after-life. Thus he tears away our Judeo-Christian, and later Eastern, teleos of a purpose in life and leaves us with a cold and naked feeling of insecurity and hopelessness. That is until he replaces this emptiness with a re-envisioned life, a new interpretation of our motivation for this life--the will to power.
Thus, the step after our liberation from antiquated moralities from killing god is to rejoice in the act and affirm the independent life. This newly discovered existential freedom cannot be filled with an objective will to truth, because as he points out in 344 that is to presume its worthy of faith, unfounded belief, which he just previously attacked. Truth, morality, divinity, immortal salvation are all preconceived values. But what does not have a preconceived value? I think he answers: the power over the self, power is the source of value. Conventionally Jesus and the Buddha were simply able to convince people that the way they were living was the good life and thus bring them together and bind them with power over convention. The admirable form of power is not conventionally binding others but the prequel to this, the freedom of the will, the ability to independently place a value on things. Though, this is limited in 354 by our need to communicate our personal desires to others through a socialized language, which ironically diminishes the personal into the social. Perhaps the frustration from this fact, that to get what we want we must distort our perceptions of our desires and turn them into a form a social utility, is the reason he thinks we must use our power over others instead.
Thus, the step after our liberation from antiquated moralities from killing god is to rejoice in the act and affirm the independent life. This newly discovered existential freedom cannot be filled with an objective will to truth, because as he points out in 344 that is to presume its worthy of faith, unfounded belief, which he just previously attacked. Truth, morality, divinity, immortal salvation are all preconceived values. But what does not have a preconceived value? I think he answers: the power over the self, power is the source of value. Conventionally Jesus and the Buddha were simply able to convince people that the way they were living was the good life and thus bring them together and bind them with power over convention. The admirable form of power is not conventionally binding others but the prequel to this, the freedom of the will, the ability to independently place a value on things. Though, this is limited in 354 by our need to communicate our personal desires to others through a socialized language, which ironically diminishes the personal into the social. Perhaps the frustration from this fact, that to get what we want we must distort our perceptions of our desires and turn them into a form a social utility, is the reason he thinks we must use our power over others instead.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
The Gay Science Book 2 & 3
Nietzsche’s critique of conviction, his characterization of German, and of course his expression “God is dead” were among some of the more interesting topics in Books 2 and 3 of The Gay Science.
In Book 2 he writes:
“Independence of the soul!-that us at stake here. No sacrifice can be too great for that: one must be capable of sacrificing one’s dearest friend for it, even if he should also be the most glorious human being, an ornament of the world, a genius without peer-if one loves freedom as the freedom of great should and he threatens this kind of freedom. (150)”
Meaning perhaps that a person should be willing to sacrifice anything, including friendship , for the sake of some faith in independence. Independence of the soul seems to be a major them in the book. He goes on later in Book 2 to criticize his idols Schopenhauer and Wagner, thus proving his independence from them and tearing down their status in his mind as idols. There seems to be many reason why intellectual independence, and independence of various other sorts are important, but I can not put my finger on why Nietzsche holds it to be important. As he often does he doesn’t formulate and write an argument only present a piece of criticism. In another part, I can’t locate it now, he attacks conviction itself which seems to be a part of independent of the soul. He hints that a brave person is able to challenge not only others’ convictions, but also their own. I couldn’t tell if he meant that it is pointless to hold convictions, or simple that we should be open to questioning them; it seems consistent with his amorality that we do not need convictions.
I wonder if his thoughts on the German language can be understood by a native-English non-German speaking person. The German language to me sounds rough, commanding, and the pronunciation of German words require a unique inflection. Perhaps this is what he means when he says that German was becoming militarized. How much of this is an indication of how a later German statesmen who used a German voice to unite the German people and convince them to accept atrocities?
His conception that “God is dead,” in passage 108 and 152 titles the New Struggles and The Madman, is challenging. This is where I think he expresses his disdain for how people use religious traditions to formulate an ethical code and direct their lives. Yet, if he is smart enough to understand that the rest of us are smart enough to know we no longer need a conception of God, then why can’t the rest accept it. Its highly controversial and a mere statement is not compelling. And if he doesn’t care to compel or convince why did he write and publish?
In Book 2 he writes:
“Independence of the soul!-that us at stake here. No sacrifice can be too great for that: one must be capable of sacrificing one’s dearest friend for it, even if he should also be the most glorious human being, an ornament of the world, a genius without peer-if one loves freedom as the freedom of great should and he threatens this kind of freedom. (150)”
Meaning perhaps that a person should be willing to sacrifice anything, including friendship , for the sake of some faith in independence. Independence of the soul seems to be a major them in the book. He goes on later in Book 2 to criticize his idols Schopenhauer and Wagner, thus proving his independence from them and tearing down their status in his mind as idols. There seems to be many reason why intellectual independence, and independence of various other sorts are important, but I can not put my finger on why Nietzsche holds it to be important. As he often does he doesn’t formulate and write an argument only present a piece of criticism. In another part, I can’t locate it now, he attacks conviction itself which seems to be a part of independent of the soul. He hints that a brave person is able to challenge not only others’ convictions, but also their own. I couldn’t tell if he meant that it is pointless to hold convictions, or simple that we should be open to questioning them; it seems consistent with his amorality that we do not need convictions.
I wonder if his thoughts on the German language can be understood by a native-English non-German speaking person. The German language to me sounds rough, commanding, and the pronunciation of German words require a unique inflection. Perhaps this is what he means when he says that German was becoming militarized. How much of this is an indication of how a later German statesmen who used a German voice to unite the German people and convince them to accept atrocities?
His conception that “God is dead,” in passage 108 and 152 titles the New Struggles and The Madman, is challenging. This is where I think he expresses his disdain for how people use religious traditions to formulate an ethical code and direct their lives. Yet, if he is smart enough to understand that the rest of us are smart enough to know we no longer need a conception of God, then why can’t the rest accept it. Its highly controversial and a mere statement is not compelling. And if he doesn’t care to compel or convince why did he write and publish?
Thursday, January 22, 2009
Question sparked by Birth Of Tragedy Section 1-6:
My first blog post.
Is Nietzsche writing about Attic Greek gods and art because he believes they were a positive expression of life. His criticism of modern religions seems to be that they are death worshipers and live for death. Whereas the Greek gods loved life and the Greeks themselves created these gods because they too wanted to enjoy life, as opposed to fear and prepare for death. Yet this interpretation of Nietzsche does not seem consistent with his nihilism. Perhaps what he is trying to get at in the first six sections of the Birth of Tragedy is what Schopenhauer expressed as the artist mirror. Schopenhauer’s pessimistic assertion of the impossibility of enjoying life favored the escape of will through art, by which artists have the capacity to distract their audience from the pain of living. Yet Nietzsche seems to express an interest in something more than escaping pain, as seen in his criticism of modern religions. Can it be that through his nihilism he will favor the hedonism exemplified in the Dionysian? That seems contradictory as well though.
Truly confused,
Cody
Is Nietzsche writing about Attic Greek gods and art because he believes they were a positive expression of life. His criticism of modern religions seems to be that they are death worshipers and live for death. Whereas the Greek gods loved life and the Greeks themselves created these gods because they too wanted to enjoy life, as opposed to fear and prepare for death. Yet this interpretation of Nietzsche does not seem consistent with his nihilism. Perhaps what he is trying to get at in the first six sections of the Birth of Tragedy is what Schopenhauer expressed as the artist mirror. Schopenhauer’s pessimistic assertion of the impossibility of enjoying life favored the escape of will through art, by which artists have the capacity to distract their audience from the pain of living. Yet Nietzsche seems to express an interest in something more than escaping pain, as seen in his criticism of modern religions. Can it be that through his nihilism he will favor the hedonism exemplified in the Dionysian? That seems contradictory as well though.
Truly confused,
Cody
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)